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1 Introduction 
1.1 A call for reform: An inadequate regime 
Corruption has traditionally been considered a problem involving public officials 
and the private interests they serve, be it their own interests or those of others. More 
recently it has been increasingly considered a problem that undermines the rule of law, 
democratic governance and sustainable development.
1
 Widespread corruption also leads to 
systemic human rights violations, and for a society to exist under the rule of law, uphold 
democratic institutions and promote development, human rights must be protected. It is 
the argument of this paper that the current legal framework dealing with corruption does 
not fully encompass the magnitude of the issue. The legal framework is too narrow in its 
focus on the criminalization of corrupt acts and lacks any consideration for third parties 
whose human rights are violated by such acts. The legal framework should address the 
reality that individuals who have no part in corrupt deals are nonetheless directly affected. 
Furthermore, the legal framework should provide for effective remedy to those whose 
human rights have been violated.   
Corruption and human rights are interrelated and have a circular cause and effect 
relationship,
2
 yet this link is not reflected in the existing corruption legal regime. The 
disharmony in the law could be remedied by including a human rights component to the 
corruption legal regime. First, there must be a change in the perception of corruption. 
Human rights must be an integral part of the overall understanding of corruption. Adding a 
human rights perspective may also have the effect of placing the fight against corruption 
in a position of higher priority within the international community. This may in turn  
                                                 
1
  Kumar (2003) p.35 "The institutionalized form of corruption creates mass victimization, which threatens 
the rule of law, democratic governance and the social fabric of any society;" see also U4 Report (2007) p.15 
2
 See supra Section 2. 
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increase the chances that both the public and private sectors will support such a change in 
the corruption legal regime.  
Section 2 of the paper discusses the link between corruption and human rights. 
Section 3 covers the general framework of current international corruption law, including 
some mention of regional instruments. Section 4 attempts to explain how the current 
corruption regime came to look the way it does by reflecting back on how the anti-
corruption movement started. Section 5 introduces the human rights framework and 
provides examples of efforts to place human rights obligations on various non-state actors. 
Also, the argument is put forward that corruption should be considered a threat to human 
rights. Section 6 presents a case study of the logging industry in Papua New Guinea to 
provide empirical evidence of how human rights are violated as a result of corruption, 
despite PNG‟s many human rights obligations under international law. The case study also 
illustrates how the current corruption legal regime lacks any recourse for the individuals 
whose human rights are violated. 
In Section 7 the paper will suggest how to create the most effective and all-
encompassing legal regime to best fight corruption and protect human rights. Two 
alternatives are proposed for how the corruption legal regime can be expanded to provide 
for human rights protection.  The first suggestion is the use of a soft law instrument, and 
the second alternative suggests that elements of the human rights legal regime be 
introduced into the corruption regime through a binding protocol to the UNCAC. The idea 
is to bring suggestions to the table and encourage discussion. The two suggestions are by 
no means meant to represent complete, final solutions to the issue set forth in this paper. 
1.2 The UNCAC as a representation of the corruption regime3  
In discussing the current corruption legal regime, a comprehensive analysis of the 
numerous anti-corruption conventions in effect will not be undertaken. Rather the United 
                                                 
3
 The term “corruption regime” is to be understood to mean a regime that combats corruption and is 
synonymous with “anti-corruption regime” 
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Nations Convention against Corruption (the UNCAC)
4
 will be used to represent the 
current regime. The UNCAC is the appropriate representative convention of the regime 
not least because it is the most recently adopted global anti-corruption convention. It is 
thought to reflect an international consensus about the measures states should take in the 
areas of prevention, criminalization, asset recovery and international cooperation on 
investigation and prosecution.
5
 This can be attributed in part to the fact that the drafting of 
the UNCAC was based upon previous anti-corruption efforts. As a result, the UNCAC 
contains many provisions which mirror those contained in, for example, the Inter-
American Convention against Corruption (the Inter-American Convention) of the 
Organization of American States (the OAS). However, the extent and detail of the 
UNCAC provisions are more far reaching than conventions that have come before it, 
particularly with regard to asset recovery and international cooperation obligations.
6
  
1.3 A focus on legal reform 
The discussion herein will not include how countries should wage anti-corruption 
campaigns. This depends on the circumstances specific to each country. Root causes of 
corruption, such as weak governance, a lack of democratic institutions, or both, will 
require different anti-corruption measures. Each country, and even in different regions 
within a single country, has to come up with a strategy to suit its particular circumstances. 
No pre-fabricated strategy will work anywhere it is applied. Questions of the causes of 
corruption and how to develop a strategy to combat it are important to understanding the 
deeply complex issue of corruption and can be seen as part of a parallel discussion to the 
one being undertaken here.
7
  The scope of this paper will be limited to the issue of 
addressing human rights within corruption law.
                                                 
4
 The United Nations will hereinafter be referred to as “the U.N.” 
5
 Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption  
6
 Transparency International 
7
 See Rose-Ackerman (2004); see also Buckley (2002) and Hussman (2007) 
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2 The link: Corruption and human rights 
2.1  The vicious circle syndrome 
Corruption both results from a failure of governance and is a cause of its continued 
failure. A system of good governance is one that encompasses transparency and 
accountability. If these characteristics are present, decision-making by the state will take 
into consideration the views of the most vulnerable minorities in society.
8
 The state will 
act in the interest of protecting its citizenry rather than in the interest of an elite few. 
Where there is a failure of governance, the state does not provide its people with the tools 
that are necessary to empower themselves against an abusive state, such as allowing them 
to exercise their freedom of expression, freedom to information and other civil liberties. 
These rights provide a society with the necessary checks and balances to influence or 
change government policy, and of course, control corruption.  Without this power in the 
hands of the people, a state can act without being called to account, including for the 
benefit of corporate interests at the expense of the general public. An absence of 
accountability and transparency allows corruption to flourish and the result is further 
human rights violations. 
In the context of development, the World Bank
9
 has said that there is a link 
between the existence of corruption and a lack of civil and political rights in a society. 
Because the successful implementation of socio-economic development policies relies on 
civil and political rights, corruption is therefore also an obstacle to the fulfillment of social 
and economic rights which depend on those policies.
10
 Despite the existence of this link, 
the Bank observes that human rights law does not include a freedom from corruption and 
                                                 
8
 U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2008) 
9
 Also hereinafter referred to as “the Bank” 
10
 Kaufmann (2006) p.3 
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anti-corruption conventions do not explicitly encompass human rights.
11
 This implies that 
a key mechanism bridging first and second generation issues—namely corruption as a 
mediating link—is explicitly omitted from coverage by human right conventions, 
declarations, and, often in the human rights field generally.
12
 The „silo‟ approaches that 
the fields of governance, rule of law, corruption and human rights have taken should be 
challenged and there should be further integration.
13
 The approach taken does have 
significant implications in terms of strategies and prospects for progress on human rights, 
and integration is necessary for improving governance and corruption control.
14
  
2.2    Corruption: A necessary evil 
 From a different perspective, the argument has been made that corruption is 
actually necessary for the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.
15
 In some of 
the poorest countries, those perpetrating petty corruption tend to take bribes as a result of 
low incomes and low standards of living. The bribes are taken merely to make ends meet. 
Under the existing corruption laws, including the UNCAC, both the givers and takers of 
bribes would be considered criminals. When the reality is that they are forced into a 
situation of inescapable daily bribery, it is does not seem fair or effective for the law to 
merely address the criminal aspects of these acts.  By changing the perspective of 
corruption the international community would see that in some societies systematic 
corruption has infiltrated every sector, working its way down from the top levels to the 
bottom levels.  A more holistic corruption legal regime would be better able to prevent and 
control corruption. Then these individuals, victims themselves, would not have to resort to 
bribery.  
                                                 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. 
13
 Id. at p. 6 
14
 Id. at p.4 
15
 Buckley (2002) p.180 
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3 Current Corrption Framework  
3.1 What is corruption? 
The traditional legal framework for fighting corruption attempts to prevent and 
criminalize corrupt acts. There is no internationally recognized uniform definition of 
corruption though a commonly accepted definition provided by the World Bank is “the use 
of public power for private benefit.”16 This definition is intended to include corruption 
perpetrated by both the public and private sectors.  Most anti-corruption instruments refer 
to a non-exhaustive list of acts that constitute corruption
17
 rather than provide a general 
definition of corruption.
18
  These acts can take the form of petty or grand corruption.
19
 
Petty corruption involves persons in positions of low-level authority such as policemen, 
medical doctors or teachers who use bribery, extortion, theft or misuse of property to gain 
small amounts of money.
20
 Grand corruption involves high-level officials using their 
authority to gain large amounts of money usually in connection with big transactions such 
as infrastructure projects.
21
 State capture is a term used to define a form of grand 
corruption where the private sector is deeply implicated in the active corrupting of public 
                                                 
16
 NORAD (2000) p.7 
17
 See Carr (2007) for a comparison of the crimes included in anti-corruption conventions, which include, but 
are not limited to bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, favoritism and nepotism, and the more recent 
offense of illicit enrichment where a public official or any other person cannot reasonably explain the 
possession of his assets. 
18
 But see Id. at p.131 the South African Development Protocol against Corruption (2001) does define 
corruption in its art 1.  
19
 NORAD (2000) 
20
 The World Bank (1999) 
21
 Sandgren (2005) p.723 The author also refers to political corruption, a serious type of grand corruption, 
which is abuse of power by political leaders for private gain and is noted for its threat to democracy. 
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officials. In a situation of state capture, a private entity, working in collusion with 
government officials, influences the shaping of state legislation, politics and regulations in 
a particular sector.
22
 State capture goes beyond mere corruption in the administration of 
existing policies, it includes the outright purchase of laws, regulations and policies by 
private companies.
23
 Representative democratic institutions are weakened through the 
capture of the democratic process by special interests.
24
  
3.2 Advancements in corruption law  
The UNCAC is considered an innovative instrument because it is more far-
reaching than previous anti-corruption instruments. Like most anti-corruption treaties, the 
UNCAC requires countries to establish criminal and other offences to cover a wide range 
of acts of corruption, if they are not already crimes under domestic law. It criminalizes not 
only basic forms of corruption but also private sector offenses and offences committed in 
support of corruption, including money-laundering and obstructing justice. The convention 
also contains a whole chapter on prevention measures, and extensive provisions regarding 
cooperation among states parties in the investigation and prosecution of offenders and on 
the tracing, freezing seizure and confiscation of proceeds. The convention also contains 
separate chapters on asset recovery and implementation mechanisms which include 
technical and economic development assistance among states and with regional 
organizations.
25
  
The contribution of regional anti-corruption instruments to the legal regime is not 
to be underestimated. The Inter-American Convention was the first juridical anti-
corruption instrument of its kind.
26
 It not only served as a model for the UNCAC, but also 
for the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Other 
Related Offenses (the AU Convention) which was adopted the same year as the 
                                                 
22
 Shah  (2004) 
23
 Rose-Ackerman (2004) p.332 
24
 Rajagopal  (1999) p.499 
25
 See www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html 
26
 Transparency International 9 Years of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (2005). 
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UNCAC.
27
 Regional regimes provide for coordinated regional efforts tailored to deal with 
corruption-related issues specific to the area. Their implementation and monitoring 
mechanisms are better able to keep track of anti-corruption measures being taken in their 
respective regions. That being said, states parties to those instruments have also signed 
onto the UNCAC. The desire for a global effort is reflected in the commitment shown by 
the international community to the UNCAC.  
3.2.1 Limited progress: the missing elementof human rights 
There is no mention of human rights violations in the UNCAC or regional regimes. 
The UNCAC does address victims of corruption, but it is clear that the convention 
addresses third-party victims in terms of commercial transactions. Terms such as “good 
faith” and “damage” bring to mind contractual relationships and monetary obligations 
rather than human rights. Pursuant to the UNCAC, a state may consider corruption a 
relevant factor in legal proceedings to rescind or annul a contract, rescind a concession, or 
other similar instrument, or to take other remedial action.
28
 Entities or persons who have 
suffered damage as a result of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings 
against those responsible for that damage in order to obtain compensation.
29
 This is the 
extent of the consideration given to the rights and remedy available to individuals if they 
should suffer an injury as a result of corruption.  
The Inter-American Convention has already celebrated its 10-year anniversary and 
implemented its Follow-Up Mechanism and has not included human rights into its regime. 
States parties are not required or asked to report on human rights, and states have not 
offered the information. The AU Convention speaks extensively of human rights in the 
preamble but contains nothing relating to human rights in its operative provisions. It has 
been said that the AU Convention was intended to complement the UNCAC, so perhaps it 
followed the UNCAC lead in not including human rights issues.
30
   
                                                 
27
 Id.  
28
 UNCAC art 34 
29
 UNCAC art 35 
30
 Honorable Dauda Kamara (2006) 
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To some extent, it could be argued that the current regime does have the potential 
to help states meet their obligations to use their available resources to achieve the full 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights as required under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
31
 Corruption impedes a state‟s ability 
use its available resources to progressively achieve the full realization of these rights 
because national resources are instead diverted into the pockets of public officials, or 
because development aid is mismanaged, misused or misappropriated. Anti-corruption 
laws, if faithfully implemented and carried out, could bring about a more efficient 
distribution of public resources which is essential for the enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights.
32
 Nevertheless, human rights protection must become part of the 
purpose of anti-corruption measures, not an unintended result of such measures.   
 
                                                 
31
 ICESCR art 2 
32
 Rajagopal (1999) p. 499 
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4      Ideology of the anti-corruption movement: A historical perspective 
The evolution of the anti-corruption movement is important to understanding why 
the legal regime has the limitations it does. Corruption became a leading international 
issue in the 1990s and was regarded as a problem of the international economy. 
Globalization caused an ever-increasing number of multinational enterprises to expand 
into new markets and it fostered conditions conducive to an escalation in corruption.
33
 In 
1997, the World Bank estimated that the cost of bribery among multinational enterprises 
was $80 billion a year.
34
 At the same time a global forum which had previously been 
lacking enabled coalitions of interested parties to set standards on international businesses 
to control corruption. Corruption was no longer going to be accepted as an 
unchallengeable part of doing business. In 1997 the OECD created the first international 
corruption convention, the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions. The aim of the anti-corruption movement was 
clear: to rid the global economy of corrupt transactions which were skewing profit 
margins.
35
  
As has been previously noted, the broader societal effects of corruption have been 
given their place in the corruption discussion.  The UNCAC maintains that corruption 
weakens the rule of law, democratic governance and sustainable development.
36
 The Inter-
American Convention asserts that corruption undermines the legitimacy of public 
institutions and strikes at society, moral order and justice, as well as at the comprehensive 
development of peoples.
37
 The AU Convention speaks of the need to respect human 
dignity and to foster the promotion of economic, social, and political rights in conformity 
                                                 
33
 Hess (2000) p.595 
34
 Buckley (2002) p.184 
35
 Id. 
36
 UNCAC preamble  
37
 Inter-American Convention preamble  
 11 
 
with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and People‟s Rights and other 
relevant human rights instruments. At the same time, it could be argued that such 
statements still primarily serve the financial sector, the need to protect the rule of law, 
governance and development principles being necessary in order to maintain a robust and 
open free- market.
38
 Regardless, the negative impact of corruption has been expressed as 
being more than just an economic problem.  
4.1    Anti-corruption efforts by non-state actors 
 Since the emergence of corruption as an international problem, various actors have 
joined in the movement to combat it. While there has been some recognition of the link to 
human rights, the majority of anti-corruption efforts are focused on curbing impacts on 
sustainable economic growth and financial policies. International financial institutions 
want to maintain economic growth to ensure socio-economic development while 
multinational corporations want to maintain markets that are favorable to investment. The 
result has been the emergence of codes of conduct, guidelines and policies reflecting the 
stance that corruption will not be tolerated by public or private actors. The rate of success 
of these efforts is questionable but it helpful to look at anti-corruption meaures in the non-
state sector.  
4.1.1      Transnational Corporations  
Corporations have a very important role in the anti-corruption movement being the 
supply-side of bribery and partaking in embezzlement. Measures to control corruption by 
the private sector are not only contained in conventions or national legislation. 
International organizations have contributed to efforts to control corporate corruption by 
producing codes of conduct and guidelines. The International Chamber of Commerce (the 
ICC) was the first non-governmental organization to establish rules of conduct for 
corporations relating to bribery.
39
 It remains an active and influential force in the corporate 
                                                 
38
 Buckely (2002) p. 191-2 
39
 First published in 1977, the ICC rules of conduct were updated in 2005 after the establishment of the 
UNCAC 
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world. In 2001, the ICC established an Anti-Corruption Commission which works actively 
with the OECD, the U.N., the Council of Europe and the European Union. The ICC rules 
of conduct recommend that corporations adopt their own codes of conduct based on its 
rules but adapted to their particular situation. It has also insisted on the need to confront 
private-to-private corruption (corruption between private entities), as this form of bribery 
also distorts competition. The ICC has established whistle blowing guidelines, works on 
strengthening links with the World Bank and other intergovernmental organizations, and 
provides businesses with input on how to implement the UNCAC.
40
 
The U.N. attempted a Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations which 
was never adopted. It did address corruption but its scope was quite broader. It also 
covered contract negotiation and implementation, non-collaboration with racist regimes, 
non-interference with political affairs and intergovernmental relations, training facilitation, 
financial transactions and investments, transfer pricing, taxation, competition, technology, 
and information disclosure. The 2000 version of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises added a new chapter on combating bribery but they also covers many topics, 
many the same as the U.N. draft code. Codes of conduct targeting corporations that focus 
on corruption, like the ICC rules, are less common than those that encompass the overall 
operation of corporations.
41
 
Corporations often establish their own codes of conduct for their employees. 
Specifically, corporations set up internal compliance and auditing systems to detect and 
discourage corrupt payments.
42
 There is the risk that a corporation will put forward a good 
faith effort only to have its employees act in contradiction with its policies. Or in the 
opposite case, a corporation establishes a policy for the sake of its public image and then 
encourages employees to gain business however possible.
43
 The additional risk is that a 
                                                 
40 International Chamber of Commerce  
41
 See Hess (2000) for an overview of corporate codes of conduct and for a proposal for a new set of 
guidelines which focus on corruption. 
42 Id. at p. 610 
43
 Id. 
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corporation can easily alter its own code to fit a its needs which may not always be in the 
interest of preventing corruption.  
4.1.2     International Monetary Fund 
The International Monetary Fund (the IMF) has remained steadfast in its focus on 
macroeconomic stabilization and sustainable growth.
44
  It only began to direct its attention 
to governance and corruption when empirical evidence increasingly showed that poor 
governance and corruption may have an actual or potential negative impact on 
macroeconomic performance.
45
 Nevertheless, as a rule, the IMF role in corruption is 
limited. According to IMF policy, it will only get involved in instances of corruption that 
have significant macroeconomic implications, have affected governance and if there is 
reason to believe it could threaten the successful implementation of the adjustment 
program.
46
 In such instances financial assistance may be suspended or delayed.
47
 Critics 
have said that this approach is too standoffish. Its loans to states are not contingent on a 
lack of corruption and it is seldom that conditions are placed on lending to try to prevent 
corruption in receiving states.  The IMF counters that conditions placed on aid as a method 
to counter corruption does not work and can even foster circumstances creating further 
corruption.
48
 However, it does agree with critics that current forms of IMF assistance can 
foster or perpetuate corruption.
49
 It has proposed reforms and procedural changes to 
decrease the recurrence of such situations.
50
 
4.1.3     The World Bank 
 The World Bank has played a more active role in fighting corruption. Since 1996, 
the Bank has supported more than 600 anti-corruption programs and governance initiatives 
                                                 
44 Schiller (2000) 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Leite (2001) 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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developed by its member countries.
51
 In particular, the Governance and Anticorruption 
Strategy was developed in light of the fact that corruption and poor governance 
significantly undermine the Bank‟s poverty reduction mission, undermine the legitimacy 
of the institution and its programs, divert resources from priority sectors and increase the 
debt of developing and transition countries.
52
 Among the criticisms of the Bank‟s 
implementation of the strategy is that while it acknowledges implementation requires 
participation by civil society organizations, the private sector, the media and the general 
public, that participation is not actually sought on the ground.
53
 One of the major critiques 
of the strategy is the absence of explicit recognition of human rights in assessing 
governance. While Bank programs may need to be improvement, anti-corruption is a 
priority in Bank policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 The World Bank Anticorruption Overview 
52
 Id. 
53 Bank Information Center (2007) 
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5 Utilizing the human rights framework 
5.1 Human rights law 
Human rights law has grown immensely in the past several decades and has become 
an established and integral area of international law. This is evidenced by the emergence 
of many sets of principles and guidelines within various non-state sectors that call for 
human rights protection. These more current efforts have their origin in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (the Universal Declaration), the first instrument to express 
the international community‟s determination to not only recognize human rights, but 
protect and fulfill them. The aspirations set forth in the Universal Declaration were later 
reinforced and turned into binding commitments in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (the ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (the ICESCR).  Subsequent conventions followed which focus on the 
protection against specific acts, such as torture
54
 or racial discrimination.
55
 Other 
conventions focus on the rights of groups of people that are particularly vulnerable, such 
as women,
56
 children
57
 or indigenous and tribal peoples.
58
 Together they have all helped to 
create a diverse and representative international human rights regime which will continue 
to expand as the international community recognizes new threats to human rights. 
                                                 
54
 See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
hereinafter referred to as the Torture Convention  
55
 See International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
56
 See Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women hereinafter referred to 
as CEDAW 
57
 See Convention on the Rights of the Child  
58
 See ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 
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Notwithstanding its importance in the world of international law, even the area of 
human rights is politically influenced. Considerable political support from the major world 
actors is often a prerequisite before a right is recognized as deserving international 
recognition and protection.
59
 Corruption as a threat to human rights has not yet gained the 
support of the international community that is needed to make an impact on the law. 
Perhaps this is because corruption has only recently, as compared to human rights, been 
considered as a problem necessitating international attention. To take the example of 
environmental law, its link to human rights has taken decades to evolve and gain 
international support.
60
 Now environmental degradation is linked to the violation of many 
human rights such as: the realization of economic, social and cultural rights indispensable 
for human dignity; the right to the highest attainable standard of health; the right to a 
standard of living adequate for health and well-being; the right of peoples to self-
determination; and the pursuit of economic and social development, to name a few.
61
 The 
effort to make the right to a clean environment an internationally recognized human right 
is well underway.  
                                                 
59
 See for example Cassese (2005) p.394-5, “. . . another customary rule is gradually crystallizing as a result 
of a host of UN GA resolutions, international treaties, as well as the increasing case law of the ICTY on rape 
and sexual assault; that is the rule banning gender discrimination.” 
60
 Kiss (2004) p.661 describing the emerging argument regarding the link between human rights and harm to 
the environment, “Protecting human rights and safeguarding the environment, […] are fundamental values 
of modern international society. The first two topics emerged as matters of international concern several 
decades apart and the earlier development of human rights law encouraged international lawyers and 
activists as early as the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment to explore and attempt to 
understand the inter-relationship [between] human rights and environmental protection.” 
61
 Sands (2003) p.297“Many states have adopted nationals measure linking the environment and individual 
rights. The constitutions of about 100 states now expressly recognize the right to a clean environment;” Id. 
at 296 
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5.2 Corruption as a threat to human rights 
The international community generally accepts that there is a connection between 
corruption and human rights.
62
 However, it has not gotten to the point where human rights 
are part and parcel of corruption. The very perception of corruption must be altered so as 
to also denote human suffering as a direct result of corruption.  Once the goal of fighting 
corruption is understood to include protection of human rights rather than merely curbing 
use of public power for private benefit, it will be seen as more of a priority within the 
international community.
63
  
Further, public and private actors
 
would rather avoid the public spectacle of being 
called out by their peers for failing to act in accordance with human rights standards. To 
have caused or allowed human rights violations to have occurred can have a considerable 
shaming effect on all parties involved in a situation, be they state or non-state actors. In 
fact, a clean human rights record is now used as a condition to allowing states to become 
members of international organizations such as the European Union or the World Trade 
Organization. In this way the human rights framework and what it represents in the 
international community is an effective means of fighting the global problems. Being 
listed on Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index further illustrates the 
point. While it too can have a shaming effect and be very damaging for countries, efforts 
to remedy the situation are left to the state, perhaps with assistance provided by 
neighboring states or development aid. Motivation to change this perception of being 
corrupt is financially focused, for example, to keep foreign investment coming in. 
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Corruption as being a threat to human rights, however, would be seen as a more urgent 
problem to solve at the international level. 
5.2.1 New threat, new perception, new regime 
It may be argued that human rights violations resulting from corruption can be 
adequately addressed by human rights treaties. From a normative standpoint, keeping 
corruption related violations exclusively in the domain of the human rights treaties and 
institutions perpetuates the perception of corruption as an area distinct and apart from 
human rights. Corruption in all its forms and consequences will only be fully addressed 
when human rights are made a part of the dialogue and accepted as an important aspect of 
it. The recognition of human rights abuses as a result of corruption could serve to preserve 
the human dignity of victims which is something the corruption legal regime fails to do 
now. All the consequences of corruption will be accounted for. In turn this will lead to an 
overall broader perception and an understanding of corruption which will ultimately have 
the benefit of better combating the problem. 
Another problem with using the human rights regime only is that ultimate 
responsibility remains on states. Though states have the due diligence obligation to 
prevent, investigate and punish violations, this does not adequately address the reality that 
state actors and private entities often work together in corrupt transactions that cause 
human rights abuses. Recently, efforts have been made to extend human rights obligations 
to non-state actors, but they have failed. In this regard, the field of human rights remains 
static. 
5.3 Human rights obligations and non-state actors 
5.3.1 International financial institutions 
The Tilburg Guiding Principles, drafted by a group of experts and completed in 
2002, express that as international legal persons, the World Bank and the IMF have 
international legal obligations to take full responsibility for human rights in situations 
where the institutions‟ own projects, policies or programs negatively impact or undermine 
 19 
 
the enjoyment of human rights.
64
 The principles propose a number of measures that could 
be taken by each institution, providing ways in which they could fit human rights into the 
existing mandates and institutions including the Bank‟s Inspection Panel and the IMF‟s 
Independent Evaluation Office. They call for cooperation and coordination with both 
human rights and development non-governmental organizations to ensure their policies are 
consistent with the needs of the communities. They are also urged to make their material 
available, on a regular basis, to relevant bodies within the U.N. human rights system, such 
as the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
Unfortunately, neither institution has accepted the Tilburg Principles nor have they 
adopted a human rights policy. The IMF has refrained from placing human rights 
conditions on its assistance to member countries. It claims not have the expertise required 
to make such judgments and suggests that human rights advocates are better suited. 
Instead its focus remains on sustainable growth and a stable macroeconomic environment, 
which in themselves are supportive of human rights. It claims to encourage member 
governments and specialized agencies to work together towards designing development 
strategies that take human rights into account.
65
 The World Bank also makes clear that it is 
not an enforcer of human rights though it has acknowledged that there is a link between 
development and human rights.
66
 It is the Bank‟s position that even if its policies, 
programs and projects have never been explicitly or deliberately aimed towards the 
realization of human rights, it contributes to the promotion of human rights by fighting 
corruption and increasing transparency of governments. The Bank is exploring the 
establishment of a Justice and Human Rights Trust Fund and says it will continue to 
dialogue and form strategic alliances with U.N. bodies, other international organizations, 
                                                 
64
 World Bank, IMF and Human Rights (2003) p.247-255 
65
 Leite (2001) 
66
 See supra Section 2 
 20 
 
donors, and civil society organizations where they can complement and add human rights 
value to its work.
67
  
5.3.2 Corporations  
The business community has a code of ethics that sets limits to the conduct of 
companies.
 68 
Many different versions of the corporate moral code have been put to paper 
by a number of international organizations. In 2003, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights came up with the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights (the Human Rights Norms). They are based on international 
human rights law and existing norms relating to transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises.
69
 The Human Rights Norms go further than these instruments by 
providing for specific human rights obligations relevant to corporations.
70
 In addition, they 
mention corruption specifically, saying corporations shall recognize and respect social, 
economic and cultural policies including transparency, accountability and prohibition of 
corruption.
71
 The norms gained much support from civil society organizations that had 
long called for corporate social responsibility, but they have been critiqued from both a 
substantive and procedural point of view.
72
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The corporate sector has shown great opposition to the Human Rights Norms, the 
thrust of the argument being that liability for human rights violations should not be shifted 
to companies and should stay within the area of state responsibility.
73
 The function of 
transnational corporations has traditionally been limited to the economic sphere and the 
Human Rights Norms extend that to social, cultural, civil, and political purposes, which is 
usually reserved for the state.
74
 The private sector complained that the norms contain 
vaguely worded obligations, an argument echoed by proponents of the norms. Whereas 
proponents argue they give a lot of discretionary power of corporations in interpreting or 
applying the norms, corporations are confused as to the extent of positive measures 
corporations are expected to take secure fulfillment of human rights.
75
 Also, extensive and 
onerous reporting procedures on observance of human rights standards would be required 
which corporations argue will discourage investment. Many companies simply argued 
they did not have a problem with human rights abuses and had no need for such norms.
76
 
Although the Human Rights Norms have met with much resistance they did 
identify what corporate social responsibility actually means. Global companies do wield 
increasing power and it is natural that responsibilities should be placed on their exercise of 
that power.  The norms do not say companies‟ human rights obligations would not be on 
par with obligations are expected of states, but limited to their sphere of activity and 
influence.  In most cases, this would apply to their employees and to the communities in 
which they operate.
77
 This formulation will be important when a reformed legal regime is 
discussed in Section 7. 
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6 Case Study: Papua New Guinea 
6.1 Captured state: corruption in the logging industry 
Since PNG ratified the UNCAC in 2007, the country has taken measures to 
implement the convention.
78
 Nevertheless, it remains in a governance crisis. Politicians are 
rarely re-elected and the expectation of being in office for only one term gives them an 
excuse to steal while they can and deal their way into lucrative post-government 
employment.
79
 In the logging industry, corruption has become so entrenched the 
government of PNG is struggling to control the situation. Trafficking in guns, drugs, 
timber and people is rampant and is threatening regional security.
80
 With the help of 
Australia and the World Bank, a wide range of reforms have been instituted in an effort to 
fight corruption in the logging industry but have had little impact. Corruption has allowed 
foreign logging companies to operate largely outside forestry laws rendering them 
ineffective.
81
 Efforts to investigate or take legal action against corruption have led to arson 
and people being physically attacked and threatened.
82
  
A common complaint of authorities is that logging companies operate are difficult 
to monitor since their operations are in such remote areas. The lack of presence also means 
the government hardly exercises authority at all in these areas.  Companies such as 
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Rimbunan Hijau take on the role of the government in rural PNG.
83
 Impunity is enjoyed 
by companies and local authorities, including the police, involved in rights abuses and 
illegal activities. The role of the Ombudsman Commission is to guard against the abuse of 
power by those in the public sector, assist those exercising public power to do their jobs 
efficiently and fairly and impose accountability on those who are exercising public 
power.
84
 While it has investigated the logging industry with regard to the granting of 
licenses, its impact on corruption is non-existent. A recent scandal has recently been 
uncovered which the Commission is set to investigate and will provide an opportunity for 
the Commission to fight corruption on a more substantive level.
85
   
6.2 Human rights in the logging industry 
The corruption in the logging industry illustrates how, “state capture adopts an 
apparatus of repressive state action imposing a series of linked human rights abuses 
committed in order to preserve the elite‟s opportunities for the abuse of public office for 
private gain.”86 PNG is party to several human rights treaties including the ICCPR, 
ICESCR and CEDAW. It is not party to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the Torture Convention), but as a jus 
cogens norm it is binding on PNG.
87
 Despite these international human rights obligations, 
rampant abuses of human rights protected by each one of those conventions occur in the 
logging industry. Not only has PNG violated its obligation to respect, protect and fulfill 
landowners‟ rights, it has also failed in its duty to prevent, investigate and punish 
violations by private parties.  
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PNG also demosrates how a lack of rights is an impetus to causing corruption. The 
protection and enjoyment of civil and political rights give civil society the voice and 
power to advocate for accountability and transparency in government.
 88
 Recent 
amendments to the Forestry Act have reduced landowners‟ rights to participate in the 
development and management of their forests. A provision was also added preventing 
National Forest Board members from disclosing information to the public.
89
 Communities 
are being kept even more out of the allocation process than ever before. Economic, social 
and cultural rights are necessary for national development. In societies where there are 
limited opportunities for formal paid employment, as in PNG, states often rely on 
exploitive deals with multinational corporations.
90
 Providing opportunities for livelihood 
from within the communities could help to avoid falling into this trap.  
6.2.1 Land acquisition process 
The process by which the PNG government acquires timber rights from 
landowning communities and issues licenses to logging companies amounts to the illegal 
appropriation of forest land by companies. A review of forest administration in PNG 
showed that officials did not follow the controls established to protect landowner rights 
and sustainable logging.
91
 The law requires that landowners meet with an independent 
facilitator who is supposed to help them make an informed decision about divesting 
themselves of their forest rights. However, in practice this precaution is often disposed of 
and logging companies negotiate directly with landowners. An independent review team 
that looked over 30 concessions found that almost without exception landowners had not 
been properly involved in decision making, were not aware of what was happening to their 
resources and had not given informed consent to logging operations.
92
 In other instances, 
companies were able to simply buy the right to operate bypassing the legal process 
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required to obtain licenses and permits. The corrupt means used by the state and 
companies to obtain rights to the forest has resulted in the loss of landowners‟ means of 
shelter and food. This is a violation of the right to internal self-determination which 
protects against a people being deprived of its own means of subsistence.
93
 
 
Once companies acquire land they operate in violation of the code of logging 
practices. For example, by building poorly designed roads that cause severe erosion in the 
soil and runoff into surrounding rivers. The result is that the community‟s water supply is 
polluted and ruined as a food source. The right to an adequate standard of living, which 
includes adequate food, housing and the continuous improvement of living conditions,
94
 
and the right to the highest attainable standard of health
95
 are violated by the subsequent 
pollution caused by operations. Companies have one objective, to get their operations up 
and running. They will puruse this at the expense of human rights and at the expense of 
the faith communities put in them to provide services they are falsely promised.
96
  
6.2.2 Working conditions 
The overall poor working conditions in the logging camps violate the right to the 
enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work.
97
 Conditions in logging camps pose 
both physical and health risks to employees. Operations are dangerous due to a lack of 
safety equipment and employees have been seriously injured.
98
 There are not sufficient 
amounts of medicine made available in the camps so not all employees who become ill are 
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treated.
99
 The failure to provide safety measures for employees and medical treatment for 
the sick violates the right to safe and healthy working conditions.
100
  
  Women are a particularly vulnerable group in the camps. There are reports that 
female employees are forced to have sex with their superiors, including police officers 
who are hired as private security.
101
 This amounts to a violation of their rights to be free 
from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment
102
 and to human dignity.
103
 
Women are kept in low-skilled jobs where they have no opportunity to learn a more 
valuable skill and are therefore easily replaced.
104
 Being relegated to menial jobs is a 
violation of the right to equal opportunity to be promoted in employment.
105
 There are also 
marriages of convenience forcefully arranged between expatriate employees and local 
women.
106
  These arranged marriages are clearly a violation of the right to enter into 
marriage with free and full consent.
107
  
It would not be overstating the situation to describe the working conditions in 
camps as slave conditions. A common practice among managers is to promise to open a 
bank account for employees to save their earnings. Many of the workers have returned 
home without ever having been paid.
108
 Salaries, when they are paid, combined with 
employment conditions are so poor as to have been officially described in one project as 
modern day slavery.
109
 The conditions not only violate the prohibition against slavery but 
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also the right to receive remuneration that provides a decent living.
110
 If an employee 
cannot earn enough salary for a decent living, it will in turn hinder the enjoyment of the 
right to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family.
111
   
Employees are not allowed to leave the camps for long periods of time, and when 
they are able to leave they must rely on company transportation. Because the camps are 
virtually isolated, many of them only accessible by plane.
112
 It is a situation akin to being 
held captive. Combined with the practice of not paying wages, this is a violation of the 
prohibition against being held in servitude.
113
 The control that companies retain over the 
movement of their employees is an obstacle to their ability to leave the camp and make a 
complaint to authorities. Together with the lack of monitoring of operations by 
government authorities it would seem that a victim would have little or no opportunity to 
make a complaint to the authorities about abuses.  
6.2.3 Police brutality 
Allegations of police brutality in connection with logging operations, including 
killings, are widespread. Specifically, there are allegations of police officers being paid by 
logging companies to provide security on their behalf. The police are instructed to use 
violence and intimidation against people who speak out against companies or against the 
communities where such people live. Landowners do not report the incidents since they 
rightly assume they will not be properly investigated.
114
 A former police officer for the 
Southern Regional Command task force confirmed allegations of police being hired by 
Rimbunan Hijau as private security. The hired officers were also instructed to use force 
against landowners who caused trouble. The former police officer was paid a daily 
allowance and an occasional lump sum by an official from a company official. These 
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payments were made secretly as "some sort of bribery-type money" which he believed was 
paid to him as compensation for using violence against the troublemakers.
115
  
A representative from the village of Bosset alleges that police hired by Concord 
Pacific logging company came into his village and arrested several men, took them to an 
airstrip, ordered them to strip at gunpoint and made them commit sex acts with each 
other.
116
 They were then taken into a logging camp and locked into timber containers. 
When they were released the police told the men they had been arrested for possession of 
guns, but not formal charges had been made.
117
 At its most extreme, the police brutality 
violates the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, especially given the stigma attached to homosexuality.
118
 The right to liberty 
and security of person ensures no one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention. This 
means deprivation of one‟s liberty shall be based on such grounds and in accordance with 
such procedures as are established by law.
119
 No grounds for detention were given by the 
police at the time of arrest. When they were released days later they were given bogus 
reasons for the detention. The right to security of person is analogous to the right to bodily 
integrity meaning an individual has the right to control what happen to his own body. The 
detainees were forced to participate in physical acts against their will. Furthermore, when 
an individual is deprived of his liberty he has the distinct and separate right to be treated 
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. This right 
was also violated as a result of the brutality imposed by the police. 
Not only does the conduct of police violate obligations set forth in several human 
rights conventions, it fails to comply with the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials (the Law Enforcement Code). The Law Enforcement Code consists of eight 
articles containing minimum rules of law enforcement behavior and responsibility, 
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including use of force by police.  According to the code, law enforcement officials shall 
respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons 
in the performance of their duty.
120
 It follows that law enforcement officials must not 
commit any act of corruption and have the duty to rigorously oppose and combat all such 
acts.
121
 The Law Enforcement Code also prohibits law enforcement officials from using 
force except when strictly necessary and only to the extent required for the performance of 
their duty.
122
 Further, no law enforcement official may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act 
of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
123
 Although the 
code is not binding international law, it constitutes authoritative guidance for interpreting 
international human rights law regarding policing.
124
  
Police brutality in PNG is widespread and is not contained to logging camps.
125
 
Though police have received extensive human rights training, they are not required to 
follow it.
126
 A climate of impunity has been created and police officers themselves risk 
retaliation for trying to hold other officers accountable.
127
 Despite the seriousness of the 
problem, there is little or no willingness on the part of police to investigate, prosecute, or 
otherwise punish its members.
128
 The occasional dismissal and prosecution of abusive 
police officers does occur though these victories are negligible when compared with the 
scope of the problem. The fact is, it is very rare for police officers to face punishment 
either through internal police disciplinary procedures or in a court of law, even at in the 
most extreme cases of excessive force, torture and rape.
129
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The lack of government presence in rural areas, with the exception of bribed local 
authorities, allows those in power to rule without accountability. If the state has little 
control over police who commit abuses at the national level, it can be assumed that police 
in remote camp areas are even more sheltered from accountability. The cooperation 
between the authorities and companies makes reporting of abuses virtually impossible for 
victims. Even in the general public outside the camp areas where perhaps there is more a 
semblance of a separation between the state and companies, there has been little success in 
holding the police accountable. Victims have appealed to government mechanisms other 
than the police, such as the public solicitor‟s office, the Ombudsman Commission and 
civil claims against the state, but even these efforts have not been effective in diminishing 
police violence.
130
 
6.2.4 Unsustainable logging 
It is widely reported that politicians and forestry officials actively solicit logging 
companies and facilitate their unsustainable and illegal activities.
131
 Allowing companies 
to operate without abiding by the sustainable logging laws and policies is taking its toll. 
Unsustainable logging is a threat to the successful enjoyment of what are known as 
solidarity rights. Of significance here is the right to a healthy and sustainable environment 
and the right to economic and social development.
132
 The ecologically and financially 
unsustainable nature of present logging operations has been amply illustrated by the 
official reviews that have been carried out on the industry. The costs of environmental 
destruction and natural resource depletion resulting from illegal practices are passed on to 
landowners and to the global community.
133
 A report found that if forests were cleared or 
degraded at their current rate, 83% of PNG‟s accessible forests would be gone or severely 
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damaged by 2021.
134
 The report concludes that this information justifies significantly 
curtailing current logging industry activities and scrapping new large-scale projects. It also 
calls for the government and international development partners to reorient conservation 
and commercial forestry activities so that they respect the rights of local communities that 
legally own the forest, and enable members of those communities to better use and 
conserve the forest for their own development needs.
135
  
In economic terms, corrupt states have less of their GDP going to areas that are 
critical to development, such as to the education and health sectors.
136
 Corrupt states also 
have comparatively lower economic growth rates than countries with little or no 
corruption.
137
 High levels of corruption also correlate with more severe levels of income 
inequality.
138
 In PNG, logging companies are manipulating tax laws and greatly 
influencing national forestry policies at the expense of national coffers and ultimately the 
general public. Based on average logs prices reported by companies, companies are 
basically operating at a deficit. Logging does not appear to be economically viable at the 
declared export prices. This has led to the suspicion that the companies are setting set 
transfer prices on cross-border transactions to reduce their taxable profits.
139
 In the past, 
the government has also given in to pressures from the logging lobby and decreased the 
log export tax,
140
 and processed timber products are exempt from export duty 
altogether.
141
 The state also receives very little from corporate income tax paid by 
companies.
142
 The tax  benefits of and questionable profit reporting by companies means 
that government is losing out on substantial revenue from logging operations. This 
invariably leads to less money going into social services for the public which reflects 
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PNG‟s ranking well behind other Pacific islands on the Human Development Index. 
Illiteracy, infant mortality rates and life expectancy are the worst in the Pacific.
143
   
Investment into countries in the form of development aid is also negatively 
impacted by corruption.
144
 Australia has made large aid contributions to PNG, but 
corruption has rendered them ineffective. The World Bank has provided loans to PNG on 
several different occasions designed to facilitate more sustainable logging and improve the 
country‟s revenue stream.145 Its last effort was a loan for a Forestry and Conservation 
Project. It included several conditions relating to proper governance in the forestry sector 
and required a comprehensive independent review of 14 of the largest existing logging 
projects. The result of the review was that all of the projects could be regarded as illegal 
from failure to meet key legal criteria. The project was suspended in 2003 and cancelled at 
the request of PNG in 2005 with only $2.6 million disbursed.
146
 Not only did PNG not 
benefit from the reforms initiated by the Bank, it was left with a massive debt. 
6.3 Effectiveness of UNCAC on the logging industry 
If PNG were to enact legislation for each of the offenses the UNCAC provides for, 
it would have little effect on what is going on in the logging industry. Perhaps the police 
officers or government authorities could be found to have committed the crime of abuse of 
function
147
 or the crime of illicit enrichment.
148
 The private parties involved can be guilty 
of the crime of bribery of a national public official.
149
 The UNCAC‟s sections on 
international cooperation and prevention may help to punish present corruption and stop 
future corruption in PNG. Asset recovery provisions could bring much needed money 
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back into the national economy. Still, these provisions do not acknowledge the harm done 
to the victims and certainly does not help to uphold their human dignity as the human 
rights regime does. A UNDP report examined the human development dimensions of 
corruption in the Asia-Pacific region. It singled out illegal logging as being particularly 
damaging for the poorest communities.
150
 The reports says petty corruption smothers 
opportunities for the most vulnerable people and causes more day-to-day suffering than 
grand corruption.
151
 It is an undisputed fact that corruption causes human suffering and 
this should be acknowledged in the law which is core of the anti-corruption movement.  
6.4 Call for Reform in PNG 
Civil society organizations have suggested a number of reforms that could help to 
alleviate the occurrence of corruption and consequent human rights violations in PNG. In 
2005, a human rights unit was established as part of the Ombudsman Office, but it remains 
small and under-resourced. Therefore, groups have called for the establishment of an 
independent human rights commission to investigate, mediate and refer complaints of 
abuses to the Ombudsman Commission.
152
 There is also a call for a commission against 
corruption with the power to investigate and take action against those found to be involved 
in corrupt practices which would complement the work of the Ombudsman Commission 
and strengthen governance.
153
 The endemic corruption in PNG means that standard law 
enforcement mechanisms may themselves harbor corrupt officials and an independent 
corruption commission can bring to light corrupt activities taking place within the 
government, at all levels.  
There is also a call for the improvement of basic services such as health and 
education. The creation of economic opportunities in rural areas is encouraged in order to 
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provide alternatives to large scale logging. Landowning groups will have more control 
over the community and will be able to make more informed decisions about it. This will 
ultimately help to control corruption since landowners will participate more actively in 
managing their resources. Organizations also call for non-state actors to take on human 
rights responsibilities and to adhere to human rights standards such as the Human Rights 
Norms and the Tilburg Principles previously discussed. They also call on the World Bank 
and Australia, who have such a significant influence on policy in PNG, to use that 
influence to reform the forestry industry. As long as corruption undermines governance 
and causes instability in the region, all the development aid from those two sources will be 
rendered useless.  
It is clear that civil society has come up with a holistic set of reforms to combat 
corruption and human rights abuses. However, as has been shown, efforts by the 
international community to expand the responsibility over corruption and human rights 
have met with much resistance. Part of the problem is the voluntary nature of the past 
measures makes them easily ignored. Perhaps utilizing a more authoritative instrument 
which proposes to better monitor, investigate, and punish prohibited acts will elicit more 
compliance. It will send a message of being a serious effort to combine the two regimes 
that cannot be ignored so easily. The best chance of success for reform in PNG is if there 
is a legal consequence to the corrupt acts that states and private parties fear. 
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7 Redefining the perception of corruption 
The UNCAC encourages states to coordinate anti-corruption policies that promote 
the participation of society and reflect the principles of rule of law, integrity, transparency, 
accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property.
154
 This has 
been interpreted as meaning that preventing and combating corruption is not an end in 
itself of the convention but promoting policies that contribute to good governance and 
ultimately sustainable development.
155
 In its Declaration on the Right to Development, the 
General Assembly said that an obstacle to development was the denial of human rights; 
that in order to promote development, equal attention must be given to the 
implementation, protection and promotion of human rights. This would seem to support 
the need to include human rights in the fight against corruption. The activists in PNG 
advocating reform in the logging industry adopt just the approach the UNCAC calls for. 
They are calling for a wide range of policy reforms in civil society as well as within 
government. They look to cooperation with PNG‟s neighbors and development agencies. 
A main objective of their fight against corruption is an equal and parallel fight against 
human rights abuses. The corruption legal regime should reflect this in order to secure the 
success of reforms like those being called for in PNG. 
7.1 Incorporation of human rights standards into corruption law 
The discussion herein has always focused on incorporating human rights into the 
corruption regime. One might consider whether it would be preferable to make corruption 
a part of the human rights legal regime, that is, that a right to be free from corruption be 
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incorporated into a human rights instrument. Either approach would be a signal to the 
world of the desire to reflect the link between corruption and human rights in international 
law.  Practically speaking, it may prove easier to add human rights to the law of corruption 
rather than to add a right to be free from corruption to human rights law. One reason is that 
there is currently no internationally accepted definition of corruption. What would a right 
to be free from corruption entail? What would be expected of states? Would it be a 
positive right or a negative right, meaning would there be obligations to respect, protect or 
fulfill the right to be free from corruption? Would it be a civil and political right and be 
included in the ICCPR or an economic, social or cultural right and be included in the 
ICESCR? Or, is there another instrument altogether that is better suited to include such a 
right? Furthermore, since a focus has been placed on the need to revamp the perception of 
corruption, a corresponding change in law should occur within the corruption regime.  
7.2 Soft law approach 
The use of soft law is one approach to integrate human rights into the corruption 
regime. Soft law refers to non-binding, quasi-legal instruments. The U.N. and its organs, 
institutional bodies established by conventions, certain NGOs and international 
organizations all contribute to soft law. It can take the form of resolutions, declarations, 
statements, general comments, codes of conduct and guiding principles. These instruments 
offer instruction to states by setting standards and norms in areas of international law 
where binding obligations are lacking. Because the obligations are non-binding, it can be 
easier for these instruments to gain political support and access to international dialogue. 
Soft law is a convenient option for negotiations that might otherwise stall if legally 
binding commitments were sought at a time when it is not convenient for negotiating 
parties to make major commitments for political and/or economic reasons but still wish to 
negotiate something in good faith in the meantime. Often soft law can act as a sort of dry 
run to see if an instrument is in practice an effective, wide-spread and harmonized set of 
rules. If so it might later be turned into a binding instrument. Or, in the alternative, 
principles can evolve into customary international law if it meets the requirements of 
opinion juris and state practice, in which case a binding instrument would be unnecessary. 
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7.2.1 The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
An example of soft law that has filled a gap where guidance was lacking is the 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (the Displacement Principles). The need for 
international standards for the protection of internally displaced persons became apparent 
in the 1990s when the number of people uprooted within their own countries by armed 
conflict, ethnic clashes and human rights abuses began to soar.
156
 A study was therefore 
conducted by a U.N. appointed representative on the causes and consequences of internal 
displacement, the status of the internally displaced in international law, the extent of the 
coverage accorded them within existing international institutional arrangements and ways 
in which their protection and assistance could be improved.
157
 The representative 
examined international human rights law, humanitarian law, and refugee law by analogy, 
and concluded that while existing law provided substantial coverage for the internally 
displaced, there were significant areas in which it failed to provide an adequate basis for 
their protection and assistance. Besides, the provisions of existing law were dispersed in a 
wide variety of international instruments which made them too diffused and unfocused to 
be effective in providing adequate protection and assistance for the internally displaced.
158
 
The result was a comprehensive instrument that sought to protect human rights within a 
context never before approached. 
The international response to the Displacement Principles has been very positive. 
They have gained widespread, international recognition. Inter-governmental agencies such 
as the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Development Program, the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights and UNICEF, have incorporated the 
Displacement Principles into their policies and have disseminated them among their 
staff.
159
 Monitoring bodies of human rights conventions, such as the Human Rights 
Committee and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, have referred to the Guiding 
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Principles in their observations to states.
160
 References to the Guiding Principles can be 
found in resolutions, recommendations and reports adopted by the African Union, the 
OAS, and the Council of Europe.
161
 States have developed national policies based on the 
principles, some states have incorporated them into national law, and courts have cited the 
principles as a basis for judgments in support of internally displaced persons.
162
 Some 
observers have suggested that, as a result of the increasing application and acceptance of 
the principles throughout the world, they may be becoming customary international law.
163
 
7.2.2 Guiding Principles on Combating Corruption and Protecting Human Rights 
The Displacement Principles evidence the importance of taking advantage of the 
moment and exploiting it for the benefit of a cause. Statistics on internally displaced 
persons had been compiled for a decade by the time the Commission on Human Rights 
requested an analysis of the situation be conducted. It was when the numbers began to soar 
that the need to take action became a pressing issue for the international community. After 
the study was conducted, the full extent of the vulnerability of internally displaced persons 
and the protections afforded them under international law, or lack thereof, was brought to 
light. Similarly, the anti-corruption movement was born in the 1990s when increasing 
reports revealed the negative effects of corruption on the international economy and 
marketplace. The culmination of the last decade has been the adoption of the UNCAC, the 
peak of international corruption law. Human rights is now a fixture in international 
dialogue and a priority for states. Perhaps now is the time for a study to be conducted into 
how extensive the effect of corruption is on human rights. A set of principles that address 
human rights obligations within the context of corruption could be established and they 
could be called the Guiding Principles on Combating Corruption and Protecting Human 
Rights (the Corruption Principles).  The Displacement Principles may offer help in this 
endeavor. 
                                                 
160
 Id. 
161
 Id. 
162
 Id. 
163
 See Schmidt (2004) 
 39 
 
A draft of the Corruption Principles will not be attempted here, but merely a 
framework for the proposed principles. The pupose of the Corruption Principles should be 
clear. Consider the Displacement Principles which say, “Every human being shall have the 
right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of 
habitual residence.”164 The Corruption Principles could state that every human being shall 
have the right to be protected against human rights violations resulting from all acts of 
corruption, be they petty or grand, by authorities, groups or persons whether public or 
private.  
One thing to consider is who will be expected to adhere to the Corruption 
Principles. Whereas human rights conventions are limited to placing obligations and 
standards on the state, the Corruption Principles are not bound by such restrictions. The 
Displacement Principles apply to all sectors of society and do not limit themselves to 
states. They provide guidance to all relevant actors, including groups and persons in their 
relations with internally displaced persons, and inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organizations.
165
 Likewise, the anti-corruption and human rights movements rely on the 
efforts of many sectors of society and the principles should reflect this. The Corruption 
Principles should provide guidance to a diverse cast of actors, among them state and 
corporate actors, civil society actors, international, regional and local non-profit and non-
governmental organizations and development aid partners.  
The Displacement Principles call on authorities and international actors to respect 
and ensure respect for their obligations under human rights and humanitarian law, in all 
circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of 
persons.
166
 Similarly, it would be ideal if corruption was prevented from ever occurring. 
The Corruption Principles should therefore call on authorities and actors to respect their 
obligations under corruption and human rights law in all circumstances to prevent 
fostering an environment where corruption is likely to occur. With regard to human rights 
obligations, the protection and enjoyment of civil and political rights are imperative to 
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preventing an environment in which parties feel they can partake in corruption without 
accountability.
167
 Fulfillment of economic, social and cultural rights contributes an 
economic situation that renders useless the need to enter into business transactions that 
harm a society rather than help it. Therefore, the protection of human rights is relevant at 
all times, in order to prevent corruption.  
Unfortunately, even where all sectors of society put their best effort forward there 
will be corruption.  Therefore, specific human rights commonly or predictably violated as 
a result of corruption should be delineated in the Corruption Principles. Awareness of 
these rights as being particularly vulnerable will allow all relevant actors to take 
appropriate measures, both preventive and remedial, to best avoid or address violations. 
Such an approach would be in line with the concept of rule of law that demands that 
obligations be clear and predictable so that those who are bound by them can be sure of 
what is expected of them. The specific rights that should be highlighted could be provided 
by U.N. bodies, non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations and 
any other relevant party that might be involved in the drafting of the Corruption Principles. 
The principles could also contribute to the promotion of solidarity rights, such as the right 
to development and the right to a healthy environment, which have been shown to be 
adversely affected as a result of corruption. Including these rights into the Corruption 
Principles helps to build international support for their protection. 
The Corruption Principles could include provisions which call on states to take 
measures that promote and facilitate victims‟ access to justice, including the means to seek 
a domestic remedy. This would not be limited to the right to seek remedy for violations of 
only certain rights, but for violations of all rights including economic, social and cultural 
and solidarity rights. This would go beyond existing human rights law in which only 
certain conventions allow individual communications to be made regarding alleged 
violations.
168
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Ultimately, the Corruption Principles would be a very different instrument from 
the Displacement Principles and they may not enjoy the same level of success, despite 
basing some of its features on the latter. However, more important than its specific 
language or provisions, the Displacement Principles express that they are attempting to 
bridge the gap that exists between human rights aspirations and the current reality. The 
Corruption Principles are an attempt to bring about changes to the corruption regime and 
thereby fill a gap in existing law. Perhaps because they are non-binding they will gain the 
necessary support needed to ensure relevant actors conform their acts to the standards and 
obligations set forth in the principles. Even if that goal is not reached the principles can 
still achieve something very important, which is to raise awareness about corruption and 
its victims, something not yet been done in international law.   
7.3 Hard law approach 
7.3.1 Optional Protocol to the UNCAC 
Another approach would be to create a binding instrument. Existing human rights 
obligations and mechanisms could be incorporated into the corruption regime via an 
optional protocol to the UNCAC (the Optional Protocol). The preamble of the UNCAC 
speaks of corruption as damaging democratic institutions and the rule of law, and as 
threatening political stability and sustainable development. All of which are linked to 
human rights. Former Secretary-General of the U.N., Kofi Annan, made a statement at the 
adoption of the convention in which he said one of the corrosive effects corruption has on 
society is that it leads to human rights violations.
169
 Further, as has been stated earlier, the 
actual enjoyment of human rights in a society is necessary to control corruption. An 
Optional Protocol to the UNCAC that addresses human rights would not be a stretch of the 
original stated purpose of the convention. To use an example from international law, rights 
and obligations relating to the abolishment of the death penalty were not originally 
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included in the ICCPR.  The parties undertook to adopt the Second Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty (the Second Optional Protocol) 
over twenty years later. It is an example of successfully extending substantive rights and 
obligations an existing convention. An Optional Protocol could incorporate human rights 
obligations by referring to existing human rights conventions. 
The monitoring body of the UNCAC is the Conference of the States Parties (the 
Conference). States parties are required to report information on its programmes, plans 
and practices, as well as on legislative and administrative measures to implement the 
convention.
170
 The Conference has the task of periodically reviewing the implementation 
of the convention by the states parties and making recommendations to improve 
implementation.
171
 The Conference is also authorized to establish supplemental review 
mechanisms as may be necessary to obtain information from states parties about measures 
they have taken in implementing the convention and their difficulties in doing so.
172
 
Further, the Conference may establish any mechanism or body it deems necessary to assist 
in the effective implementation of the convention.
173
  
Since the Conference is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the 
entire UNCAC, it could use its authority to establish a whole new mechanism, such as a 
committee, to monitor implementation of the additional human rights obligations 
established in the Optional Protocol. States could be required to provide additional 
information to the new committee on efforts to implement human rights into anti-
corruption efforts. For example, states could be required to report on what measures they 
are taking to ensure civil and political rights vital to maintaining a transparent and 
accountable government
174
  
Also, a valuable source would be committees responsible for monitoring 
implementation of human rights conventions. There is no need to duplicate work, so the 
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UNCAC commmittee and those established by human rights conventions should maintain 
an information exchange. Though the new committee under the UNCAC would focus on 
human rights violated as a result of corruption, maintaining communication with the 
relevant human rights committees would offer a more well-rounded surveillance of human 
rights.  
Like the monitoring bodies of human rights conventions, the new committee could 
also be given authority receive communications from individuals or groups of individuals 
claiming to have had their human rights violated as a result of one of the corrupt acts 
found in the UNCAC. Where the committee finds there has been a violation it will report 
its findings and make recommendations to the state in question as to how to remedy the 
violation. To provide for broader vigilance, the right to submit communications can be 
extended to non-governmental organizations such as is allowed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
175
 Though 
the findings would not be binding, the reliable shaming ability of human rights could 
prove to be a deterrent to future violations.  
The UNCAC is unclear about how often states are required to submit information 
to the Conference. With regard to the new committee, the Optional Protocol could specify 
that states are to submit reports regarding human rights measures they have taken within a 
certain time period after the entry into force of the protocol. It could also require that 
reports be submitted on a regular basis, on a yearly basis for example. Non-governmental 
organizations and international organizations are currently allowed to submit information 
to the Conference, and human rights groups will surely be able and willing to provide 
information to the new committee as long as they are allowed to participate.  
The purpose of establishing an individual complaint mechanism is to offer an 
independent body that can be relied on to address human rights concerns. A practical issue 
for victims may be access to the committee to make an allegation. The Human Rights 
Committee and the CEDAW Committee both require that domestic remedies be exhausted 
before submitting a complaint with them. It raises the question of what chance a victim of 
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corruption actually has to use the mechanism established by the proposed Optional 
Protocol. It might be a situation where both the state and private entities act together in 
causing a human right violation. The victim may choose to avoid local authorities 
altogether thinking  there is no possibility the state will act with due diligence in 
investigating complaints that they may well be participating in and benefitting from.
176
 Or 
even worse, the victims fear they will be punished for trying to interfere in the system. 
Were the complaint system modeled on the procedures of the human rights regime, 
victims could effectively be precluded from seeking out domestic remedies and would be, 
presumably, barred from using the complaint mechanism. However, there is precedent for 
allowing victims to seek remedy without having exhausted domestic remedies where local 
authorities were unable or unwilling to cooperate.
177
  Such exceptions could be reflected in 
the UNCAC individual complaint mechanism.  
It should be remembered that corruption and human rights are separate areas of law 
whose procedures should always be respected. It is important that the committee‟s duty to 
pursue human rights allegations would not interfere with the state‟s decision of how to 
proceed with domestic criminal law and vice versa. If the state pursued criminal charges 
against the perpetrators of corrupt acts it should not be a foregone conclusion that the 
human right violation allegedly suffered was a result of the corrupt act. Nor should it 
hamper or limit the investigation to be taken by the complaints committee. Just like the 
finding by the committee that a human rights violation was the direct result of a corrupt 
act could not be used as proof against individuals charged with crimes of corruption in 
order to find that person guilty, as this would be a violation of their due process rights.  
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7.4 Obstacles to changing the corruption regime 
As discussed above, human rights law places obligations on states to not only 
combat violations by state actors but to prevent violations by private parties. Corrupt acts 
can be committed by public and private entities. Should investigation of those acts 
uncover that they also caused human rights violations, the state‟s responsibility is 
triggered. States may not want to place additional risk on themselves by having human 
rights obligations in the area of corruption law as well. When a state is found to be 
responsible for violations, the fallout can be very politically damaging. With regard to 
expectations relating to corruption, a state that fails to meet them has the challenge of 
ridding itself of the stigma of being a corrupt state. But by implementing the UNCAC and 
an anti-corruption policy, these states can maintain the appearance of trying to reform their 
reputation. Responsibility for human rights that result from corruption will make the fight 
to regain face within the international community that much harder. For these reasons, 
states will probably show resistance to adding human rights to corruption law. Civil 
society will play an important role in promoting a change to the corruption regime and 
convincing states that supporting such a change is in their best political interests.  
The corporate sector has already voiced its opinion about having human rights 
obligations placed on it, as demonstrated by the protest against the Human Rights Norms. 
However, there are plenty of examples in the history of international business that show 
companies have made the mistake of ignoring changing moral attitudes in the marketplace. 
The backlash experienced by tobacco companies when they failed to take into account 
changing attitudes about marketing to children or by Nike when it failed to promptly 
respond to customer concerns that products were being made in sweatshops ended up 
harming the very thing companies are supposed to prioritize, their shareholders.
178
 The 
international community has voiced its desire to have the corporate world play a role both 
in combating corruption and protecting human rights. The two interests are even contained 
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in many of the same codes of conduct.
179
 If companies want to keep up with the 
international consensus, it might be in their best interest to adhere to standards of conduct 
relating to corruption and human rights. From a financial perspective, corporations can 
best maintain the value of their stocks by avoiding the shame of being associated with 
human rights violations or corruption.   
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8 Conclusion  
It has taken the past decade or so for the international community to acknowledge 
the link between corruption and human rights. This paper has argued that it is now time to 
move forward and create new legal tools to give substance to the implications arising from 
this link.  For what good is acknowledging that corruption leads to human rights violations 
if it has no legal effect for the victims? The international community has created an 
corruption regime that has as its focus redressing the abuse of public power for private 
benefit. A corruption regime which focuses solely on penalizing the perpetrators of 
corruption but does not at the same time address the victims can no longer be relied upon 
to adequately address corruption.  
If the gap that exists in corruption law is to be bridged, there needs to be a 
fundamental change in how corruption is perceived. If this were to happen there would be 
a corresponding change in how corruption is handled by the law.  The people committing 
corrupt acts must think of their behavior beyond the limitations of the current perception. 
The elite in the highest levels of society believe they are merely tipping the balance of a 
transaction in their favor in order to make a profit or get a deal done. This trickles down 
through society and ends with the poor who engage in petty corruption merely to gain a 
service not available without paying a bribe. Perhaps if the perception of corruption is 
expanded to include human suffering, people may be less willing to participate in these 
acts in the future and the cycle would end. This change in perception has to occur within 
the mainstream, not just among the human rights sector, for states and lawmakers to  feel 
the pressure to affect the change in law.  
The UNCAC, the most recently and most widely adopted anti-corruption 
convention, has introduced innovative elements that expand the traditional corruption 
regime. Despite these advancements, the convention‟s aim remains narrowly focused on 
the economic aspects of corruption. Specifically, how the illicit acquisition of personal 
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wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic institutions, national economies and the 
rule of law; how cases that involve vast quantities of assets of the state threaten the 
political stability and sustainable development of those states.
180
 The preamble speaks of 
the links between corruption and other forms of crime, in particular organized crime and 
economic crime, but there is nothing about the link between corruption and human rights. 
While the paper does not disagree with these statements, the understanding of the problem 
of corruption limited. Abuse of human rights also threatens democratic institutions, the 
rule of law, political stability and sustainable development. In order to adequately protect 
against threats to these institutions, the convention should also protect against and remedy 
human rights abuses that result from corruption. 
The case study of Papua New Guinea provides an example of how the UNCAC 
fails to adequately address the rampant corruption taking over the logging industry and the 
country. The money from logging operations that should be coming into national coffers 
has disappeared. Social and economic development is suffering as a result and the country 
continues to be one of the poorest in the area.
181
 These are the consequences of corruption 
that the UNCAC does not address. It is not disputed that preventing corruption in the 
logging industry and/or recovering assets gained from corruption could benefit the people 
of Papua New Guinea immensely, in particular with regard to the progress of 
development. The argument is that the law does not deal with the full extent of the harm 
caused by corruption. The individuals whose human rights are violated deserve to have 
their harm acknowledged by the law that was put in place to fight the very corruption that 
caused those violations. 
Two alternatives could accomplish the goal of having victims acknowledged by 
international law, a soft law instrument or a binding optional protocol to the UNCAC. Soft 
law allows for a progressive evolution of international law which serves the goals of this 
paper well since changing the perception of corruption may require time. Also, it is easier 
for soft law to gain political support since it is non-binding. States will be more open to 
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supporting it and adhering to it if they believe it is of their own will. Finally, the 
opportunity of starting from a clean slate allows the new instrument to combine corruption 
and human rights law in a way that has never been done before. An Optional Protocol may 
seem preferable for the exact opposite reason. Using obligations, institutions and 
mechanisms that already exist and have proven effective in the human rights regime could 
be incorporated right into a protocol to another existing convention. Though not exactly 
the same scenario, the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR shows the possibility of 
adding new substantive rights and obligations to an existing regime. An Optional Protocol 
would be binding legal instrument and since it would be an extension of the UNCAC may 
be able to use its U.N. connection to draw support. 
Corruption is a crime that brings out the most self-interested sides of people. That 
does not mean the human rights factor is completely ineffectual as a source of motivation 
to fight corruption. On the contrary, it has already been discussed how human rights is an 
ever-expanding area of law that offers a sense of immediacy and importance to issues that 
otherwise might be overlooked. Just as politicians do many things to keep up a certain 
appearance or appeal to a certain interest group, they know the importance of a clean 
human rights record. In the end, adding a human rights perspective may be the very thing 
that actually has a real impact on controlling corruption.  
The following quote is a powerful denouncement of corruption. Looking at it today 
it represents both a sign of hope and one of pessimism:  
[Corruption] deepens poverty; it debases human rights; it degrades the environment; it derails 
development, including private sector development; it can drive conflict in and between nations; 
and it destroys confidence in democracy and the legitimacy of governments. It debases human 
dignity and is universally condemned by the world‟s major faiths.182 
The law must address its failure to address victims of corruption. All victims of human 
rights abuses, including those caused by corruption, deserve to seek a remedy. More than 
punishing the perpetrator or receiving compensation, victims deserve the opportunity to 
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speak out against their wrongdoers. Only then can they take back and preserve their 
human dignity.  
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